The World Bank compares the economies of 190 countries in accordance with their capability to incentivize entrepreneurial activity. At the international level, the report confirms the positive convergence between the systems of the most advanced countries and those of developing countries. At the Italian level, the World Bank points out the almost total immobility of the regulatory system, with serious problems in tax and judicial matters (Rassegna trimestrale dell’Osservatorio AIR, July 2019 X/3)

On January 30, 2017, President Donald J. Trump signed Executive Order 13,771, which directs each agency to repeal at least two existing regulations before issuing a new regulation (referred to as the “one‐in‐two‐out” requirement) and imposes a regulatory budget that sets a cap on total incremental regulatory costs (set at zero for fiscal year 2017). The regulatory budget concept has been kicked around for decades, while the one‐in‐two‐out requirement is more recent and has been implemented in Canada, the United Kingdom, and Australia to various extents. Legal scholars and commentators have been quick to opine on the Order, with some pointing out ways in which it is irrational or impractical and others defending aspects of the Order such as the imposition of a regulatory budget.
In this Essay, we take a somewhat different approach by evaluating how well the Order is likely to achieve its purpose of helping agencies “be prudent and financially responsible in the expenditure of funds.” Although vaguely laudable, this purpose is illaudably vague. We will therefore ground our analysis by defining the goal (or goals) of the Order according to priorities that have been adopted by prior administrations or promoted by scholars, commentators, or interest groups. For purposes of this analysis, we take no normative position on whether these end goals are desirable.
The three potential goals that we evaluate the Order against are: (1) increasing the net benefits of regulations, (2) decreasing regulatory burdens, and (3) increasing presidential control over agencies. We then compare the Order against regulatory reform efforts in other countries. We conclude that the Order is unlikely to sensibly (much less prudently or responsibly) achieve any of these goals without significant changes

President-elect Trump committed to “a requirement that for every new federal regulation, two existing regulations need to be eliminated” or what could be called a “two-for-one” requirement.
The implementation of such a regulatory “pay as you go” process raises a number of issues including: what constitutes a “new regulation”; how offsets should be measured; estimating and managing additional analytic and administrative workload; enforcement; and how to increase the likelihood such a policy survives the next presidential transition. This working paper presents the advantages and disadvantages of various options for implementing a two-for-one policy, and also discusses the role of regulatory benefits estimates in such a system.

Radical innovations and break-through technologies are desperately needed in solving to-day’s difficult societal challenges, such as those created by climate change or ageing demographics. However, addressing complex societal challenges requires elaborate systemic planning, determined investments and often also, visionary and brave decisions by the legislators and regulators.
While radical innovation may bring much needed economic benefits and solutions to pressing societal challenges, they can also generate new risks and ethical dilemmas. Hence, today’s legislators are faced with difficult questions in trying to foresee an optimal legal framework, which would sufficiently leave space for and encourage new solutions, but at the same time would ensure safe conditions and fair benefits to everyone.
In light of the above, increased attention is paid to developing innovation-friendly regulatory approaches and practices. The introduction of European Commission’s Innovation Principle, as well as several national initiatives (such as regulatory sandboxes and regulation roadmaps), are good examples of such development.
So far, there has not been a common definition, nor a comprehensive framework to grasp the different aspects of innovation-friendly regulation approaches and practices. Developing such framework has been one of the main objectives in Finnish government commissioned study on “Impacts of regulation on innovation and new markets”. This Policy Brief presents some first findings and introduces a draft framework for innovation-friendly regulation.

Innovation is an essential element of the internal market. Defined by the objective of a “highly competitive social market economy, aiming at full employment and social progress, and a high level of protection and improvement of the quality of the environment” (Article 3 (3) TEU), innovation is a precondition of “sustainable and job-creating growth”.1 It leads to higher productivity and competitiveness2 while yielding social and environmental benefits.

Complaints about excessive economic burdens associated with regulation abound in contemporary political and legal rhetoric. In recent years, perhaps nowhere have these complaints been heard as loudly as in the context of regulations targeting the use of coal as an energy source, as production levels in the coal industry dropped nearly by half between 2008 and 2016. The coal industry and its political supporters, including the President of the United States, have argued that a suite of air pollution regulations imposed by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) during the Obama Administration seriously undermined coal companies’ bottom lines, presenting an existential threat to the industry. Under the Trump Administration, industry players have lobbied hard for (and sometimes received) financial subsidies and regulatory changes, with the President seemingly all-too-happy to play the role of the industry’s savior.
Stepping back, we ask whether regulations have really led to the decline in demand for coal and how much the coal industry can actually expect to gain from the de-regulatory policies of the current Administration. To address these questions, we statistically analyze stock market reactions to important events in what critics called the regulatory “war on coal” during the Obama Administration. Using an event-study framework that measures abnormal market activity in the immediate wake of these events, we are able to isolate any potential impact of regulation above and beyond market factors, such as secular trends in natural gas prices and market performance as a whole. Surprisingly, we find no systemic evidence consistent with a regulatory “war on coal” based on investor assessments of the industry’s financial prospects, even though our methods do find evidence of stock market reactions to other events, such as bankruptcies of other companies. The very actors with financial stakes in understanding the impact of regulation on the coal industry never bought into the regulatory “war on coal” narrative.
Our findings are consistent with other evidence about the effects of regulation and with an underlying political economy of regulatory scapegoating, according to which actors in a declining industry prefer to blame regulation rather than competitive factors for the decline. By recognizing the pervasive incentives for scapegoating and cheap talk by politicians seeking to be saviors, we explain the mismatch between the evidence and the rhetoric of the “war on coal,” and along the way we also show how important it is for courts, government officials, and the public to demand careful analysis and evidence before agencies make regulatory decisions.

The European Commission has recognised the importance of a more innovation-oriented EU acquis, gradually exploring the ways in which EU rules can support innovation. The ‘innovation principle’ was introduced to ensure that whenever policy is developed, the impact on innovation is fully assessed. However, as further discussed in this Study, the exact contours of the innovation principle have been shaped very gradually within the context of the EU better regulation agenda: originally advocated by industry in the context of the precautionary principle, the innovation principle has gradually been given a more articulate and consistent role, which aims at complementing the precautionary principle by increasing the salience of impacts on innovation during all phases of the policy cycle.
This Study presents an evaluation of the current implementation of the innovation principle, limited to two of its three components, i.e. the Research and Innovation Tool included in the Better Regulation Toolbox, and the innovation deals. As a preliminary caveat, it is important to recall that the implementation of the innovation principle is still in its infancy, and thus the Study only represents a very early assessment of the extent to which the innovation principle is being correctly implemented, and whether changes would be required to make the principle more effective and useful in the context of the EU better regulation agenda.
The main finding is that the innovation principle has the potential to contribute to the quality and future-proof nature of EU policy, but that significant changes and effort will be needed for this potential to fully materialise. The most evident areas for improvement are related to the lack of a clear legal basis, the lack of a widely acknowledged definition, the lack of awareness among EU officials and stakeholders, and the lack of adequate skills among those that are called to implement the innovation principle. As a result of these problems, the impact of the innovation principle on the innovation-friendliness of the EU acquis has been limited so far. The Commission should clarify in official documents that the Innovation principle does not entail a de-regulatory approach, and is not incompatible with the precautionary principle: this would also help to have the principle fully recognised and endorsed by all EU institutions, as well as by civil society, often concerned with the possible anti-regulatory narrative around the innovation principle in stakeholder discussions.
Apart from clarifications, and further dissemination and training, major improvements are possible in the near future, especially if the innovation principle is brought fully in line with the evolving data-driven nature of digital innovation and provides more guidance to the Commission on how to design experimental regulation, including inter alia so-called ‘regulatory sandboxes’. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the innovation principle is given prominence with the transition to the Horizon Europe programme, in particular due to the anticipated launch of ‘missions’ in key domains.