One-stop shops have emerged as a way for governments to provide better services and improve regulatory delivery to citizens and business. The OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy: One-Stop Shops for Citizens and Business offer a set of practical considerations for designing, operating, and reviewing one-stop shops. The Principles are based on a series of case studies and cover a wide range of tools and institutional arrangements to help governments improve their one-stop shops. This report is part of a series on “best practice principles” produced under the auspices of the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee. As with other reports in the series, it extends and elaborates on principles highlighted in the 2012 Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance.

In recent years, sunset clauses have mostly been associated with emergency legislation introduced in the wake of terrorist attacks. However, as this book demonstrates, they have a long history and a substantial constitutional impact on the separation of powers and the rule of law. In addition, the constitutional value of such clauses is examined from certain neglected normative aspects pertaining to concepts such as deliberative and consensus democracy, parliamentary sovereignty and constitutional dialogue.
The work is an amalgam of three perspectives: the historical, the positive and the normative. All three are intertwined and each subsequent part builds upon the findings of the previous one. The historical perspective investigates the historical development of sunset clauses since the first Parliaments in England. The positive perspective examines the legal effect and the contemporary utility of sunset clauses. Finally, the normative perspective analyses their interaction with several models of separation of powers, and their influence on the dialogue between various institutions as it values their impact on the rule of law, formal and substantive.
The detailed examination of this topical subject will be a valuable resource for academics, researchers and policy makers.

A wide range of areas—including administrative procedures, environment and energy, nutrition benefits, immigration, and healthcare—experienced important regulatory developments during the past year. This Regulatory Insight highlights ten notable themes related to regulation that occurred in 2019, just as our lists for 2017 and 2018 did.

This article provides insights into the effective regulation of private sector innovation. It coins a term—“innovation-framing regulation”—to describe a particular quality of much of financial regulation in the recent era. It sketches a particular financial innovation (securitization and the marketing of securitized assets on derivatives markets), and describes three regulatory interactions having to do with that innovation. I identify three key assumptions that are ripe for re-evaluation: the notion that private sector innovation is beneficial, virtually by definition; the assumption that the regulatory moment is the crucial moment in regulatory design; and the belief that regulation somehow sits outside innovation and can be untouched by it. I argue that effective regulation of private sector innovation requires a clearer and more nuanced understanding of innovation, and engagement with the normative choices underpinning innovation-framing regulation.

The European Commission has recognised the importance of a more innovationoriented EU acquis, gradually exploring the ways in which EU rules can support innovation. The ‘innovation principle’ was introduced to ensure that whenever policy is developed, the impact on innovation is fully assessed. However, as further discussed in
this Study, the exact contours of the innovation principle have been shaped very gradually within the context of the EU better regulation agenda: originally advocated by industry in the context of the precautionary principle, the innovation principle has gradually been given a more articulate and consistent role, which aims at complementing the precautionary principle by increasing the salience of impacts on innovation during all phases of the policy cycle. This Study presents an evaluation of the current implementation of the innovation principle, limited to two of its three components, i.e. the Research and Innovation Tool included in the Better Regulation Toolbox, and the innovation deals. As a preliminary caveat, it is important to recall that the implementation of the innovation principle is still in its infancy, and thus the Study only represents a very early assessment of the extent to which the innovation principle is being correctly implemented, and whether changes
would be required to make the principle more effective and useful in the context of the EU better regulation agenda. The main finding is that the innovation principle has the potential to contribute to the quality and future-proof nature of EU policy, but that significant changes and effort will be needed for this potential to fully materialise. The most evident areas for improvement are related to the lack of a clear legal basis, the lack of a widely acknowledged definition, the lack of awareness among EU officials and stakeholders, and the lack of adequate skills among those that are called to implement the innovation principle. As a result of these problems, the impact of the innovation principle on the innovation-friendliness of the EU acquis has been limited so far. The Commission should clarify in official documents that the Innovation principle does not entail a deregulatory approach, and is not incompatible with the precautionary principle: this would also help to have the principle fully recognised and endorsed by all EU institutions, as well as by civil society, often concerned with the possible anti-regulatory narrative around the innovation principle in stakeholder discussions. Apart from clarifications, and further dissemination and training, major improvements are possible in the near future, especially if the innovation principle is brought fully in line with the evolving data-driven nature of digital innovation and provides more guidance to the Commission on how to design experimental regulation, including inter alia so-called ‘regulatory sandboxes’. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the innovation principle is given prominence with the transition to the Horizon Europe programme, in particular due to the anticipated launch of ‘missions’ in key domains.

This report summarises the results of the study ‘Assessing the impacts of EU regulatory barriers on innovation’. To obtain the necessary data, a European-wide survey was conducted in 2016. This study focused on four sectors: energy, food, health and water. Each of these four sectors addressed the innovation system and regulatory framework, alongside questions on challenges, innovation drivers and barriers. While regulatory barriers to innovation were identified for the whole economy as well as within the four sectoral studies, the overall impact of regulation on innovation is predominantly neutral to positive. The main regulatory barrier identified concerns ‘conflicting regulation’ rather than a single type of regulation. The study also found that compliance with regulation creates innovation, with a net gain of EUR 3-6 billion per year in additional innovation investments and in terms of employment a net gain of 120 000 additional jobs. Removing existing regulatory barriers could release up to EUR 4-8 billion on general innovation investment per year.

The world’s largest businesses must routinely police other businesses. By public mandate, Facebook monitors app developers’ privacy safeguards, Citibank audits call centers for deceptive sales practices, and Exxon reviews offshore oil platforms’ environmental standards. Scholars have devoted significant attention to how policy makers deploy other private sector enforcers, such as certification bodies, accountants, lawyers, and other periphery “gatekeepers.” However, the literature has yet to explore the emerging regulatory conscription of large firms at the center of the economy. This Article examines the rise of the enforcer-firm through case studies of the industries that are home to the most valuable companies, in technology, banking, oil, and pharmaceuticals. Over the past two decades, administrative agencies have used legal rules, guidance documents, and court orders to mandate that private firms in these and other industries perform the duties of a public regulator. More specifically, firms must write rules in their contracts that reserve the right to inspect third parties. When they find violations, they must pressure or punish the wrongdoer. This form of governance has important intellectual and policy implications. It imposes more of a public duty on the firm, alters corporate governance, and may even reshape business organizations. It also gives resource-strapped regulators promising tools. If designed poorly, however, the enforcer-firm will create an expansive area of unaccountable authority. Any comprehensive account of the firm or regulation must give a prominent role to the administrative state’s newest gatekeepers.