This article investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis during an antiregulatory period. The period since 2016 has seen several new developments, including the first vigorous use by Congress of its power to overturn recently issued regulations and the creation of novel deregulatory mechanisms layered on top of cost-benefit analysis. This period also contains important examples of sharply reversed CBAs, in which regulations that were said to have large net benefits under Obama are instead said to have net costs under Trump. The Trump Administration’s regulatory review initiatives focus heavily on costs, with limited attention to benefits. Case studies of three high-profile regulations show that the economic analysis of one is seriously defective, another admits to having severe limitations, and a third systematically reduces the scale of benefits. Some of these characteristics may be analytically defensible, others seemingly are not. It is even harder to connect Congress’s recent uses of the Congressional Review Act to either a concern about net benefits or even a desire to reduce the economic burdens of regulation. Thus, cost-benefit analysis seems overall a marginal part of current regulatory policymaking.

Why should regulators be independent? How is it possible to reduce the gap between de iure and de facto independence? This OECD guidance addresses this topic by analysing the five dimensions in which the “culture of independence” should spread: role clarity and responsibility, transparency and accountability, financial independence, independence of leadership, and staff behaviour (Maria Bianca Armiento, Rassegna Osservatorio Air, n. 4/2019).

The quest for “better” regulation is one being driven forward with a new urgency within the United Kingdom, the European Union and by international bodies such as the OECD. In this country,
regulatory improvement strategies have been applied by governments for nearly 20 years and it is now appropriate to consider whether the better regulation movement is founded on secure approaches and assumptions; whether it is heading in the right conceptual direction, and, more particularly, whether it conduces to “smarter” regulatory regimes--regimes that offer the best mixtures of regulatory instruments and institutions.
This article outlines the development of the better regulation movement within government, it describes the regulatory improvement tools that governments have deployed in furthering that movement, and then it considers the capacity of the “better regulation” approach to deliver smarter regulation. It will be argued that there are a number of identifiable reasons--practical and theoretical--why the better regulation movement may not readily conduce to the production of “smarter” regulatory policies and regimes.

The quality of procedural rules might significantly affect the quality of public decisions, an aim that is strongly promoted at European and international level. Indeed, a well-designed decision-making process might help in attaining general public decisions which are lawful, necessary, proportionate, consistent, well-written and accessible to stakeholders.
The quality of procedural rules is the result of a balance between guarantees that must be provided for stakeholders, on the one hand, and efficiency and effectiveness of decision-making processes, on the other. Undoubtedly, there might be some tension between these aims, the first asking for more procedural constraints, the second raising the issue of how deep the decision-making procedure might be in order to assure both cost-effectiveness and well-reasoned decisions. This issue is tackled by procedure-simplifying measures, introduced by the policies of administrative simplification (which are analysed in chapter 1 of this section). However, such a balance is hardly to be found in general terms or imposed through a top-down approach alone. On the contrary, it often emerges from well-designed decision making processes, with predetermined, identified steps, whose depth of analysis (and their reasons) must be transparent and justified in the final decision.
The quality of procedural rules might also be enhanced by the use of specific techniques aiming at increasing empirical data that enables better informed public decisions (e.g. environmental impact assessment, competition assessment, and risk assessment). These tools might be considered as techniques for improving procedural rules because they are intended to increase the awareness of the problem at stake and prevent public decisions from unintended consequences. However, while such techniques should enable evidence-based general decisions, it is not always the case, due to reasons which are both intrinsic and extrinsic to these tools.

Evaluation of public policies has only recently presented itself as a potential competence of the “new” Italian Senate. While this reform is consistent with the perspective of a Senate of Regions, it rises many sensitive issues which, if not properly addressed, could undermine the effectiveness of the public policy evaluation. Such issues are mainly related to the division of powers between the two Chambers and to the blurred boundaries of the different functions entrusted to the Senate. Another crucial issue is the question of how to ensure the separation of technical and political dimensions of the evaluation. The paper discusses these points focusing on organizational and procedural choices for greater effectiveness of the evaluation function.

The EU's new approach to policy evaluation is characterised by a focus on closing the policy cycle (linking ex ante and ex post appraisal) and by applying evaluation to all types of policy intervention, whether expenditure or regulatory policy. This article analyses the main features and challenges of this new approach. It first studies the conceptual and interdisciplinary challenge of such an encompassing approach to evaluation. It then assesses the new approach in the light of four key objectives of ex ante and ex post appraisal; ensuring evidence and learning; accountability, transparency and participation; policy coherence; and reducing the regulatory burden.