Publications

Open government enthusiasts assume that more public participation will lead to better government policymaking: If we use technology to give people easier opportunities to participate, they will use these opportunities to participate effectively. However, experience with technology-enabled rulemaking (e-rulemaking) belies this assumption. Engagement of new participants most often takes the form of mass comment campaigns orchestrated by advocacy groups. Challenging the conventional highly negative response to mass commenting, Prof. Nina Mendelson has recently argued that, in a democratic government, agencies should give at least some weight to the value preferences expressed in such comments when rulemaking involves value judgments. Engaging this important argument, we propose a framework for assessing the value of technology-enabled rulemaking participation. Our position -- that the types of preferences expressed in mass comments may be good enough for electoral democracy but they are not good enough for even heavily value-laden rulemaking -- challenges both the Web 2.0 ethos and the common open-government belief that more public participation, of any kind, is a good thing. In rulemaking and similar complex policymaking processes, more public participation is good only if it is the kind of participation that has value in the process. We offer specific principles of participation-system design that are drawn from both normative conceptions of the responsibilities of a democratic government and from the design-based research being carried on by the CeRI (Cornell eRulemkaing Iniative) in the Regulation Room project. We argue that design of civic engagement systems must involve a purposeful and continuous effort to balance “more” and “better” participation, and stress that a democratic government should not actively facilitate public participation that it does not value.

At a time when policy makers want to change the behaviour of citizens to tackle a broad range of social problems, such as climate change, excessive drinking, obesity and crime, a promising new policy approach has appeared that seems capable of escaping the liberal reservations typically associated with all forms of regulatory action. The approach, which stems from the increasingly ubiquitous findings of behavioural research, is generally captured under the evocative concept of ‘nudge.’ Inspired by ‘libertarian paternalism,’ it suggests that the goal of public policies should be to steer citizens towards making positive decisions as individuals and for society while preserving individual choice. As governments are taking considerable interest in the use of ‘nudging,’ this collection of essays provides a pioneering analysis of this innovative policy approach as it is currently experimented in the United Kingdom and the United States. In particular, it aims at critically examining the application of nudging approaches to the current efforts of regulating lifestyle choices, such as tobacco use, excessive use of alcohol, unhealthy diets and lack of physical exercise. In his opening essay, Nudging Healthy Lifestyles, Adam Burgess provides a critical assessment of the introduction of behavioural, nudging approaches to correct lifestyle behaviours in the UK. His thought-provoking analysis triggered a lively debate that has been framed along the subsequent essays signed by On Amir and Orly Lobel, Evan Selinger and Kyle Powys White, Alberto Alemanno and Luc Bovens. Each of these essays critically reflects upon the effectiveness as well as legitimacy of ‘nudging’ approaches.

Impersonal default rules, chosen by private or public institutions, establish settingsand starting points for countless goods and activities -- cell phones, rental car agreements, computers, savings plans, health insurance, websites, privacy, and much more. Some of these rules do a great deal of good, but others might be poorly chosen, perhaps because those who select them are insufficiently informed, perhaps because they are self-interested, perhaps because one size does not fit all. The existence of heterogeneity argues against impersonal default rules. The obvious alternative to impersonal default rules, of particular interest when individual situations are diverse, is active choosing, by which people are required to make decisions on their own. The choice between impersonal default rules and active choosing depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. In complex and unfamiliar areas, impersonal default rules have significant advantages, but where people prefer to choose, and where learning is both feasible and important, active choosing may be best, especially if people’s situations are relevantly dissimilar. At the same time, it is increasingly possible for private and public institutions to produce highly personalized default rules, which reduce the problems with one-size-fits-all defaults. In principle, personalized default rules could be designed for every individual in the relevant population. Collection of the information that would allow accurate personalization might be burdensome and expensive, and might also raise questions about privacy. But at least when choice architects can be trusted, personalized default rules offer almost all of the advantages of active choosing without the disadvantages.

A brief, authoritative introduction to field experimentation in the social sciences. Written by two leading experts on experimental methods, this concise text covers the major aspects of experiment design, analysis, and interpretation in clear language. Students learn how to design randomized experiments, analyze the data, and interpret the findings. Beyond the authoritative coverage of the basic methodology, the authors include numerous features to help students achieve a deeper understanding of field experimentation, including rich examples from the social science literature, problem sets and discussions, data sets, and further readings.