Publications

With the exception of few comparative case studies, the literature on regulatory reform and regulatory impact analysis (RIA) tends to focus on internal political actors, activities, and processes. Furthermore, empirical analyses of new public management have overlooked the dynamics of communications among networks of administrative reformers. This article fills these gaps, presenting results of an event history analysis on the diffusion of RIA. It probes rationales for the origin of RIA and administrative capacity explanations in combination with variables referring to international and transnational communication channels of administrative reforms. A hypothesis based on legal origin is also tested. The findings show that the decision to adopt RIA rests on transnational networks as well as administrative variables such as government expenditure and legal origin.

European governments have adopted policy instruments for regulatory appraisal, oversight, ex‐post evaluation, and simplification in the context of the so‐called ‘smart regulation agenda’. In this article we compare the two most important instruments, that is, regulatory impact assessment (RIA) and the standard cost model (SCM). We answer the following questions: What are the economic rationales that, at least in principle, should make the SCM and RIA work? What are the learning models that, yet again in principle, allow the two instruments to produce effects? The RIA economic rationale is grounded in welfare economics. The SCM economics is rudimentary: one can hardly make an economic case for the SCM. With regard to learning models, RIA draws on rational‐synoptic models, whilst the SCM is inspired by experience‐based learning. We then discuss economic rationales and learning models jointly, thus explaining the different implementation patterns of the two instruments and exposing the ambiguities in the relationship among instruments, ideas, and behavioural change.

This report offers a brief introduction to behavioural science and its application in an EU policy context. It explains what needs to be taken into consideration when applying behavioural science to policy. It stresses the need to identify the behavioural element of a policy and select the appropriate method of research. The report also provides illustrations of how behavioural science has been applied in the past and offers practical recommendations for designing behavioural studies.

The government has published a revised set of government consultation principles. These principles give clear guidance to government departments on conducting consultations. We have amended the principles in the light of comments from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee and to demonstrate the government’s desire to engage more effectively with the public.
We will use more digital methods to consult with a wider group of people at an earlier stage in the policy-forming process. We will make it easier for the public to contribute their views, and we will try harder to use clear language and plain English in consultation documents.
We will also reduce the risk of ‘consultation fatigue’ by making sure we consult only on issues that are genuinely undecided.

Open government enthusiasts assume that more public participation will lead to better government policymaking: If we use technology to give people easier opportunities to participate, they will use these opportunities to participate effectively. However, experience with technology-enabled rulemaking (e-rulemaking) belies this assumption. Engagement of new participants most often takes the form of mass comment campaigns orchestrated by advocacy groups. Challenging the conventional highly negative response to mass commenting, Prof. Nina Mendelson has recently argued that, in a democratic government, agencies should give at least some weight to the value preferences expressed in such comments when rulemaking involves value judgments. Engaging this important argument, we propose a framework for assessing the value of technology-enabled rulemaking participation. Our position -- that the types of preferences expressed in mass comments may be good enough for electoral democracy but they are not good enough for even heavily value-laden rulemaking -- challenges both the Web 2.0 ethos and the common open-government belief that more public participation, of any kind, is a good thing. In rulemaking and similar complex policymaking processes, more public participation is good only if it is the kind of participation that has value in the process. We offer specific principles of participation-system design that are drawn from both normative conceptions of the responsibilities of a democratic government and from the design-based research being carried on by the CeRI (Cornell eRulemkaing Iniative) in the Regulation Room project. We argue that design of civic engagement systems must involve a purposeful and continuous effort to balance “more” and “better” participation, and stress that a democratic government should not actively facilitate public participation that it does not value.

A companion piece to Rulemaking vs. Democracy: Judging and Nudging Public Participation that Counts, this Essay continues to examine the nature and value of broader public participation in rulemaking. Here, we argue that rulemaking is a “community of practice,” with distinctive forms of argumentation and methods of reasoning that both reflect and embody craft knowledge. Rulemaking newcomers are outside this community of practice: Even when they are reasonably informed about the legal and policy aspects of the agency’s proposal, their participation differs in kind and form from that of sophisticated commenters. From observing the actual behavior of rulemaking newcomers in the Regulation Room project, we suggest that new public participation is often, if not predominantly, experiential in nature and narrative in form. We argue that it is unrealistic to expect that rulemaking newcomers can be significantly inculcated into the norms and methods of the existing rulemaking community of practice. Yet, the potential policymaking value of the on-the-ground, situated knowledge they can bring to the discussion justifies efforts to expand our understanding of the kinds of comments that should “count” in the process. We take some first steps in that direction in this Essay.

At a time when policy makers want to change the behaviour of citizens to tackle a broad range of social problems, such as climate change, excessive drinking, obesity and crime, a promising new policy approach has appeared that seems capable of escaping the liberal reservations typically associated with all forms of regulatory action. The approach, which stems from the increasingly ubiquitous findings of behavioural research, is generally captured under the evocative concept of ‘nudge.’ Inspired by ‘libertarian paternalism,’ it suggests that the goal of public policies should be to steer citizens towards making positive decisions as individuals and for society while preserving individual choice. As governments are taking considerable interest in the use of ‘nudging,’ this collection of essays provides a pioneering analysis of this innovative policy approach as it is currently experimented in the United Kingdom and the United States. In particular, it aims at critically examining the application of nudging approaches to the current efforts of regulating lifestyle choices, such as tobacco use, excessive use of alcohol, unhealthy diets and lack of physical exercise. In his opening essay, Nudging Healthy Lifestyles, Adam Burgess provides a critical assessment of the introduction of behavioural, nudging approaches to correct lifestyle behaviours in the UK. His thought-provoking analysis triggered a lively debate that has been framed along the subsequent essays signed by On Amir and Orly Lobel, Evan Selinger and Kyle Powys White, Alberto Alemanno and Luc Bovens. Each of these essays critically reflects upon the effectiveness as well as legitimacy of ‘nudging’ approaches.

Impersonal default rules, chosen by private or public institutions, establish settingsand starting points for countless goods and activities -- cell phones, rental car agreements, computers, savings plans, health insurance, websites, privacy, and much more. Some of these rules do a great deal of good, but others might be poorly chosen, perhaps because those who select them are insufficiently informed, perhaps because they are self-interested, perhaps because one size does not fit all. The existence of heterogeneity argues against impersonal default rules. The obvious alternative to impersonal default rules, of particular interest when individual situations are diverse, is active choosing, by which people are required to make decisions on their own. The choice between impersonal default rules and active choosing depends largely on the costs of decisions and the costs of errors. In complex and unfamiliar areas, impersonal default rules have significant advantages, but where people prefer to choose, and where learning is both feasible and important, active choosing may be best, especially if people’s situations are relevantly dissimilar. At the same time, it is increasingly possible for
private and public institutions to produce highly personalized default rules, which reduce the problems with one-size-fits-all defaults. In principle, personalized default rules could
be designed for every individual in the relevant population. Collection of the information that would allow accurate personalization might be burdensome and expensive, and might also raise questions about privacy. But at least when choice architects can be trusted, personalized default rules offer almost all of the advantages of active choosing without the disadvantages.

Red tape is not desirable as it impedes business growth. Relief from the administrative burdens that businesses face due to legislation can benefit the whole economy, especially at times of recession. However, recent governmental initiatives aimed at reducing administrative burdens have encountered some success, but also failures. This article compares three national initiatives – in the Netherlands, UK and Italy - aimed at cutting red tape by using the Standard Cost Model. Findings highlight the factors affecting the outcomes of measurement and reduction plans and ways to improve the Standard Cost Model methodology.