Publications

The present article examines the concept of effectiveness in relation to European legislation. Effectiveness is a concern associated with European legislation since the early days of the internal market and one that is assuming increasingly disconcerting dimensions. However, in its existing understanding, effectiveness is almost exclusively linked to transposition, implementation and enforcement of European legislation by the member states and is not seen as an indicator of legislative quality that pemeates the entire process of legislative design and drafting. This article maintains that the dynamic concept of legislative effectiveness is linked not only to the transposition and the implementation of legislation but primarily to choices of legislative design and drafting. The design and drafting of European legislation pose specific challenges to me capacity of legislation to achieve common minimum standards and results. These challenges are explored in detail by looking into the European Equality Directives (Directives 2000/78/EC and 2000/43/EC). This article concludes that effectiveness as a law making principle is not adequately reflected in the existing European law-making toolkit and a new approach is required that sets effectiveness at the ‘heart’ of me law-making culture and process.

The objective of this paper is to introduce the main tools used to manage the flow and the stock of regulation with special attention to those based on economic analysis, their advantages and weak points, the consequences of their use in public sector organization, procedures and, in general, in the relationship between regulators and their targets. Discussion is also devoted to conditions for improving their efficacy, since the tools need to be used selectively, and require an agenda-setting phase as well as periodic retrospective analysis of existing rules as used in the whole regulation life cycle. Therefore, it is crucial to understand what these good regulation tools are really intended for, and to avoid their over or under-evaluation, both of which could be influential in reforms made partially or in name only. At the same time, their limits could incentivize the search for innovative solutions, such as a special attention to the real needs and behaviour of people in the design of new regulation, as well as in its measurement and reform

How regulations are implemented and enforced, and how compliance is ensured and promoted, are critical determinants of whether a regulatory system is working as intended. Inspections are one of the most important ways to enforce regulations and to ensure regulatory compliance. Based on the 2014 OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Enforcement and Inspection, this Toolkit offers government officials, regulators, stakeholders and experts a simple tool for assessing the inspection and enforcement system in a given jurisdiction, institution or structure. Its checklist of 12 criteria can be used to identify strengths and weaknesses, gauge actual performance, and pinpoint areas for improvement. The OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy: Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections seeks to construct an overarching framework to support initiatives on improving regulatory enforcement through inspections, making them more effective, efficient, less burdensome for those who are inspected and at the same time less resource-demanding for governments. The principles address the design of the policies, institutions and tools to promote effective compliance – and the process of reforming inspection services to achieve results. The report complements the 2012 Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance and is intended to assist countries in reforming inspections and developing cross-cutting policies on regulatory enforcement. The principles have an informal non-binding status of a guidance approved at the Regulatory Policy Committee level.

Simpler government arrived four years ago. It helped put money in your pocket. It saved hours of your time. It improved your children’s diet, lengthened your life span, and benefited businesses large and small. It did so by issuing fewer regulations, by insisting on smarter regulations, and by eliminating or improving old regulations. Cass R. Sunstein, as administrator of the most powerful White House office you’ve never heard of, oversaw it and explains how it works, why government will never be the same again (thank goodness), and what must happen in the future. Cutting-edge research in behavioral economics has influenced business and politics. Long at the forefront of that research, Sunstein, for three years President Obama’s “regulatory czar” heading the White House Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, oversaw a far-reaching restructuring of America’s regulatory state. In this highly anticipated book, Sunstein pulls back the curtain to show what was done, why Americans are better off as a result, and what the future has in store. The evidence is all around you, and more is coming soon. Simplified mortgages and student loan applications. Scorecards for colleges and universities. Improved labeling of food and energy-efficient appliances and cars. Calories printed on chain restaurant menus. Healthier food in public schools. Backed by historic executive orders ensuring transparency and accountability, simpler government can be found in new initiatives that save money and time, improve health, and lengthen lives. Simpler: The Future of Government will transform what you think government can and should accomplish.

With the exception of few comparative case studies, the literature on regulatory reform and regulatory impact analysis (RIA) tends to focus on internal political actors, activities, and processes. Furthermore, empirical analyses of new public management have overlooked the dynamics of communications among networks of administrative reformers. This article fills these gaps, presenting results of an event history analysis on the diffusion of RIA. It probes rationales for the origin of RIA and administrative capacity explanations in combination with variables referring to international and transnational communication channels of administrative reforms. A hypothesis based on legal origin is also tested. The findings show that the decision to adopt RIA rests on transnational networks as well as administrative variables such as government expenditure and legal origin.