Publications

For the past decades, scholars from varied scientific fields have insisted on the need to develop ‘future-proof solutions’. Future proofing science, design, architecture, and technology entails the creation of solutions that are forward-looking, sustainable, resilient, and can adapt to complex challenges. In the last years, lawmakers have also become intrigued by the question whether laws and policies could also be future-proof. This question has become particularly relevant considering the rapid changes that characterize the digital age. The implementation of a future-proof approach to legislation has nonetheless remained overlooked in the legal literature. This paper aims to fill this gap with an interdisciplinary analysis of future proofing and a discussion of the challenges of implementing this approach to lawmaking. We contend that future proofing law is a challenging task for legislators but a cautious forward-looking approach could ensure that legislation becomes more adaptable and flexible to innovation. Drawing on the interdisciplinary literature on future proofing, we suggest the broader employment of experimental legislation and regulatory impact assessments.

Cost-benefit analysis (“CBA”) has faced significant opposition during most of its tenure as an influential agency decisionmaking tool. As advancements have been made in CBA practice, especially in more complete monetization of relevant effects, CBA has been gaining acceptance as an essential part of reasoned agency decisionmaking. When carefully conducted, CBA promotes transparency and accountability, efficient and predictable policies, and targeted retrospective review. This Article highlights an underappreciated additional effect of extensive use of CBA to support agency rulemaking: reasonable regulatory stability. In particular, a regulation based on a wellsupported CBA is more difficult to modify for at least two reasons. The first reason relates to judicial review. Courts take a “hard look” at agency findings of fact, which are summarized in a CBA, and they require justifications when an agency changes course in ways that contradict its previous factfinding. A prior CBA provides a powerful reference point; any updated CBA supporting a new course of action will naturally be compared against the prior CBA, and the agency will need to explain any changes in CBA inputs, assumptions, and methodology. The second reason relates to the nature of CBA. By focusing on the incremental costs and benefits of a proposed change, CBA can make it difficult for an agency to justify changing course, especially when stakeholders have already relied on the prior policy. Together, these forces constrain the range of changes that agencies could rationally support. CBA thus promotes regulatory stability around transparent and increasingly efficient policies. But, admittedly, this CBA-based stabilizing influence gives rise to several objections. This Article responds to, among others, concerns about democratic accountability and, most importantly, the use of alternative methods of policy modification. Overall, the Article concludes that CBA and judicial review of CBA play a desirable role in stabilizing regulatory policy across presidential administrations.

The European Commission has recognised the importance of a more innovation-oriented EU acquis, gradually exploring the ways in which EU rules can support innovation. The ‘innovation principle’ was introduced to ensure that whenever policy is developed, the impact on innovation is fully assessed. However, as further discussed in this Study, the exact contours of the innovation principle have been shaped very gradually within the context of the EU better regulation agenda: originally advocated by industry in the context of the precautionary principle, the innovation principle has gradually been given a more articulate and consistent role, which aims at complementing the precautionary principle by increasing the salience of impacts on innovation during all phases of the policy cycle. This Study presents an evaluation of the current implementation of the innovation principle, limited to two of its three components, i.e. the Research and Innovation Tool included in the Better Regulation Toolbox, and the innovation deals. As a preliminary caveat, it is important to recall that the implementation of the innovation principle is still in its infancy, and thus the Study only represents a very early assessment of the extent to which the innovation principle is being correctly implemented, and whether changes would be required to make the principle more effective and useful in the context of the EU better regulation agenda. The main finding is that the innovation principle has the potential to contribute to the quality and future-proof nature of EU policy, but that significant changes and effort will be needed for this potential to fully materialise. The most evident areas for improvement are related to the lack of a clear legal basis, the lack of a widely acknowledged definition, the lack of awareness among EU officials and stakeholders, and the lack of adequate skills among those that are called to implement the innovation principle. As a result of these problems, the impact of the innovation principle on the innovation-friendliness of the EU acquis has been limited so far. The Commission should clarify in official documents that the Innovation principle does not entail a de-regulatory approach, and is not incompatible with the precautionary principle: this would also help to have the principle fully recognised and endorsed by all EU institutions, as well as by civil society, often concerned with the possible anti-regulatory narrative around the innovation principle in stakeholder discussions. Apart from clarifications, and further dissemination and training, major improvements are possible in the near future, especially if the innovation principle is brought fully in line with the evolving data-driven nature of digital innovation and provides more guidance to the Commission on how to design experimental regulation, including inter alia so-called ‘regulatory sandboxes’. Finally, the Commission should ensure that the innovation principle is given prominence with the transition to the Horizon Europe programme, in particular due to the anticipated launch of ‘missions’ in key domains.

This article investigates the role of cost-benefit analysis during an antiregulatory period. The period since 2016 has seen several new developments, including the first vigorous use by Congress of its power to overturn recently issued regulations and the creation of novel deregulatory mechanisms layered on top of cost-benefit analysis. This period also contains important examples of sharply reversed CBAs, in which regulations that were said to have large net benefits under Obama are instead said to have net costs under Trump. The Trump Administration’s regulatory review initiatives focus heavily on costs, with limited attention to benefits. Case studies of three high-profile regulations show that the economic analysis of one is seriously defective, another admits to having severe limitations, and a third systematically reduces the scale of benefits. Some of these characteristics may be analytically defensible, others seemingly are not. It is even harder to connect Congress’s recent uses of the Congressional Review Act to either a concern about net benefits or even a desire to reduce the economic burdens of regulation. Thus, cost-benefit analysis seems overall a marginal part of current regulatory policymaking.

Effective antitrust enforcement requires that national authorities are empowered with strong intervention powers and real independence, both from the industry, as well as from the political power. In the field of European competition law, it is also necessary that the powers and the independence of national antitrust authoritiesare harmonised, in order to allow a real cooperation among them and between them and the European Commission. The Directive (EU) 2019/1 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 December 2018 is aimed at increasing the independence, resources and powers of NCAs and envisages more harmonisation of the national leniency programmes and reduced burdens on undertakings (Livia Lorenzoni, Rassegna Osservatorio Air n. 4/2019).

Introduzione. Strumenti (avanzati) di better regulation e realtà dei processi decisionali, di Gabriele Mazzantini e Nicoletta Rangone Capitolo primo. Il quadro internazionale ed europeo, di Laura Cavallo Capitolo secondo. L’AIR e la VIR, di Davide Zaottini Capitolo terzo. L’analisi d’impatto della regolazione sulla concorrenza, di Gabriele Mazzantini Capitolo quarto. Le consultazioni pubbliche, di Carolina Raiola Capitolo quinto. La trasparenza e l’accountability delle autorità indipendenti, di Emma Galli, Ilde Rizzo e Carla Scaglioni Capitolo sesto. La funzione di supervisione. Parlamento, autorità amministrative indipendenti e AIR: un connubio possibile, di Valerio Di Porto Capitolo settimo. Compliance ed enforcement della regolazione indipendente, di Livia Lorenzoni e Florentin Blanc Capitolo ottavo. Il contributo del Consiglio di Stato e dei TAR alla qualità della regolazione, di Simona Morettini

Also in the digital age, markets work properly as long as consumers are well informed. What is peculiar of the digital age is that consumers have become very fragile, also because firms can extensively manipulate the information that they produce and distribute to markets. Antitrust authorities may find their way to prosecute business manipulative conduct, as some rulings suggest. However, the enforcement of antitrust law is subject to precise circumstances and requires cumbersome proceedings, especially when dominant firms are involved. Therefore, a simpler and more widespread intervention is needed. Although over the years traditional disclosure regulation has showed its limits, today algorithmic analysis gives room to more effective forms of disclosure regulation. Therefore, the paper maintains that both regulators and antitrust authorities can use these new forms of disclosure regulation to perform better their functions. Thanks to algorithmic analysis, (a) regulators can provide consumers with targeted co-regulated disclosures; (b) while competition authorities, using their advocacy powers, can provide trustworthy rankings and reviews about firms’ ability to comply with antitrust and consumer protection laws.