Publications

Literature
Rulemaking
Nicoletta Rangone (2023)
Artificial Intelligence Challenging Core State Functions: A Focus on Law-making and Rule-making
The use of AI in the public sector is emerging around the world and its spread affects the core States functions: the administrative, the judiciary, and the legislative. Nevertheless, a comprehensive approach to AI in the life-cycle of rules - from the proposal of a new rule to its implementation, monitoring and review- is currently lacking in the rich panorama of studies from different disciplines. The analysis shows that AI has the power to play a crucial role in the life-cycle of rules, by performing time-consuming tasks, increasing access to knowledge base, and enhancing the ability of institutions to draft effective rules and to declutter the regulatory stock. However, it is not without risks, ranging from discrimination to challenges to democratic representation. In order to play a role in achieving law effectiveness while limiting the risks, a complementarity between human and AI should be reached both at the level of the AI architecture and ex post. Moreover, an incremental and experimental approach is suggested, as well as the elaboration of a general framework, to be tailored by each regulator to the specific features of its tasks, aimed at setting the rationale, the role, and adequate guardrails to AI in the life-cycle of rules. This agile approach would allow the AI revolution to display its benefits while preventing potential harms or side effects.
Literature
Impact assessment
Zachary D. Liscow; Cass R. Sunstein (2023)
Efficiency vs. Welfare in Benefit-Cost Analysis: The Case of Government Funding
In Republican and Democratic administrations, regulatory and funding decisions have both been made with close reference to benefit-cost analysis (BCA). With respect to regulation, there has been a great deal of scholarly discussion of BCA and its limits, but almost no attention has been paid to the role of BCA in government funding. That is a serious gap, not least in connection with climate-related risks, such as wildfire, drought, extreme heat, and flooding. In OMB Circular A-94, the Office of Management and Budget has long required applicants for federal funding to demonstrate that the benefits of their projects would exceed the costs. Under Circular A-94, efficiency-based BCA can produce results that fail to maximize welfare and that are also highly inequitable. The 2023 draft revision of Circular A-94, focused on welfare and equity, reflects an effort to incorporate new academic thinking over the past three decades, which is now—not uncontroversially—being brought directly into policy. At the same time, the new draft Circular A-94 raises fresh questions about how best to promote welfare, and to consider equity, in practice. Pressing issues involve the use of distributional weights in funding decisions and also the use of averages across populations, which might be seen as a form of distributional weighting. More broadly, the trajectory of this benefit-cost guidance, which predates the guidance for regulation and originally covered regulation, helps uncover the logic under which BCA has been operating and deeper challenges and tensions within BCA, in the past and going forward.
Literature
Artificial Intelligence and new technologies regulation
Luca Megale (2023)
Il Garante della privacy contro ChatGPT: quale ruolo per le autorità pubbliche nel bilanciare sostegno all’innovazione e tutela dei diritti?
[ITA] I recenti provvedimenti del Garante privacy nei confronti di ChatGPT, un sistema di intelligenza artificiale generativa di proprietà di OpenAI, sollevano riflessioni sul ruolo e la capacità delle autorità pubbliche di supportare l’innovazione tutelando al contempo i cittadini. Gli interventi del Garante mettono in luce l’impatto sull’attuazione amministrativa di una regolazione obsoleta - il Regolamento europeo generale sulla protezione dei dati - che contribuisce all’ineffettività dei provvedimenti rispetto agli obiettivi perseguiti. Neppure è risolutiva l’impostazione molto poco flessibile della proposta di Regolamento europeo sull’IA, laddove è invece auspicabile un mutamento del paradigma regolatorio alla base dell’intervento pubblico. -- [ENG] The recent actions taken by the Italian Data Protection Authority against ChatGPT, a generative artificial intelligence system owned by OpenAI, prompt reflections on the role and ability of public authorities to support innovation while simultaneously protecting citizens. The interven- tions by the Privacy Authority shed light on the impact of an outdated regulatory framework, the European General Data Protection Regulation, on the regulatory delivery, thereby impeding the effectiveness of these measures in achieving their intended goals. Furthermore, the proposed European Regulation on Artificial Intelligence, with its rigid approach, fails to provide a definitive solution, as there is a need for ashift in the regulatory paradigm underlying public intervention.
Literature
Competition enforcement
Herbert Hovenkamp (2023)
The Power of Antitrust Personhood
Antitrust law addresses conspiracy, or collaborative conduct, more harshly than it does unilateral conduct. One person acting alone can get away with far more than groups of firms acting by agreement. In most cases that distinction is justified. Creating substantial market power unilaterally is difficult and relatively uncommon, but it can be created in a moment’s time by an agreement among firms. But how do antitrust tribunals determine when conduct is unilateral rather than collaborative? Often the ansawer is obvious, but sometimes it is not. Two statutory provisions were intended to be the umpire of such decisions. A section of the Sherman considered so important that it was re-enacted in the Clayton Act provides that corporations and associations authorized by state law should be treated as “persons,” or single actors. The provisions address the core problems about internal corporate structure, including the single-entity status of holding companies, the legitimacy or not of suits between shareholders or employees and their firm, or the status of professional associations. The fact that the Sherman Act’s corporate personhood provision was re-enacted virtually verbatim in the Clayton Act is significant, because the intervening quarter century had witnessed a fierce debate over the power and reach of the business corporation. The personhood provisions fall short, however, because they completely ignore most of the interesting cases where conspiratorial capacity is in issue. They have nothing to contribute to situations where the precise boundaries of the corporation become ambiguous. Nor do they provide a solution to the problem of how to address labor disputes between an employer and its own employees. Further, and inadvertently, the statutes have encouraged certain types of industry structures that are not mandated by good competition policy, including the tendency to merge in order to avoid harsh rules about collusion, and the tendency to integrate vertically by ownership even when contractual integration might be superior.