Publications

Regulators in a number of countries are increasingly developing “risk‐based” strategies to manage their resources, and their reputations as “risk‐based regulators” have become much lauded by regulatory reformers. This widespread endorsement of risk‐based regulation, together with the experience of regulatory failure, prompts us to consider how risk‐based regulators can attune the logics of risk analyses to the complex problems and the dynamics of regulation in practice. We argue, first, that regulators have to regulate in a way that is responsive to five elements: (1) regulated firms' behavior, attitude, and culture; (2) regulation's institutional environments; (3) interactions of regulatory controls; (4) regulatory performance; and (5) change. Secondly, we argue that the challenges of regulation to which regulators have to respond vary across the different regulatory tasks of detection, response development, enforcement, assessment, and modification. Using the “really responsive” framework, we highlight some of the strengths and limitations of using risk‐based regulation to manage risk and uncertainty within the constraints that flow from practical circumstances and, indeed, from the framework of risk‐based regulation itself. The need for a revised, more nuanced conception of risk‐based regulation is stressed.

Ideas regarding ‘better regulation’ and ‘high-quality regulation’ have become key aspects of contemporary administrative reform initiatives. What explains the popularity of this agenda? What does the comparative experience tell us about its impact? And what is its future? This article suggests that the contemporary debate is flawed by competing assumptions hiding behind a common language. A more promising approach is to embed high-quality regulation into regulatory conversations rather than imposing requirements through hierarchical means.

Over the last decade the interest in the quality of EU legislative instruments has surged due to serious threats to the effectiveness of the legislation. This contribution makes an inventory of the policies and instruments that have been put into place to improve quality of legislation and assesses their character, orientation and effectiveness. Any appraisal of these policies, so the paper argues, is dependent on a perception of the basic functions attributed to EU legislative instruments and the standards derived from it. The paper concludes that the present policies and instruments for better lawmaking have the ability to promote regulatory quality, but not necessarily overall legislative quality.

Can the European regulatory state be managed? The European Union (EU) and its Member States have looked at Better Regulation as a possible answer to this difficult question. This emerging public policy presents conceptual challenges to scholars of public management and administrative reforms, but also opportunities. In this conceptual article, we start from the problems created by the value-laden discourse used by policy- makers in this area, and provide a definition and a framework that are suitable for empirical/explanatory research. We then show how public administration scholars could usefully bring Better Regulation into their research agendas. To be more specific, we situate Better Regulation in the context of the academic debates on the New Public Management, the political control of bureaucracies, evidence-based policy, and the regulatory state in Europe

Much has been written on the diffusion of public management and regulatory reform tools. Available evidence suggests that cross-national policy diffusion is an increasingly significant phenomenon, especially in the European context. While internationalisation of policy discourses and expert communities are regarded as key driving forces of policy diffusion, public management reforms are also said to be particularly vulnerable to mechanisms of ‘diffusion without convergence’. This paper analyses the case of policies aiming at reducing administrative burdens of regulations through the lens of the literature on policy diffusion. The diffusion of the so-called Standard Cost Model for measuring administrative burden between 2003 and 2007 is used as a case to explore the mechanisms facilitating policy diffusion in this domain. The analysis reveals patterns of rapid diffusion. This policy boom has been driven by a combination of different mechanisms of policy diffusion rather than by a single driving factor

Government is committed to conducting formal impact assessments of the need for and likely impact of new regulations. A National Audit Office report has found that scrutiny of proposed legislation is strengthening and that the standard is better than it was, but one fifth of assessments still did not include any quantified data to assess costs or benefits.
The Better Regulation Executive (BRE) has introduced new guidance, templates and training to improve the quality of impact assessments and, as a result, impact assessments have clearer presentation of results, better planning for implementation, and more quantification of costs and benefits.
But wide variation remains between the best and worst impact assessments. Where they are done well, the impact assessments include a clear statement of the policy problem, make good use of consultation and have clear recommendations.
On the other hand, only 20 per cent of impact assessments presented the results of an evaluation of a range of regulatory options. Many impact assessments did not pay enough attention to compliance and enforcement issues. For example, only one third of assessments assessed the cost of enforcement for the preferred option.
There have been improvements in the analysis of costs and benefits. In 2008, 67 per cent of impact assessments quantified costs and 60 per cent quantified benefits. Under the previous arrangements, the figures were 56 per cent for quantified costs and 40 per cent for quantified benefits. There is, however, still wide variation in the level of evidence provided and insufficient analysis in the weaker impact assessments.

In their recently published book Nudge (2008) Richard H. Thaler and Cass R. Sunstein (T&S) defend a position labelled as ‘libertarian paternalism’. Their thinking appeals to both the right and the left of the political spectrum, as evidenced by the bedfellows they keep on either side of the Atlantic. In the US, they have advised Barack Obama, while, in the UK, they were welcomed with open arms by the David Cameron's camp (Chakrabortty 2008). I will consider the following questions. What is Nudge? How is it different from social advertisement? Does Nudge induce genuine preference change? Does Nudge build moral character? Is there a moral difference between the use of Nudge as opposed to subliminal images to reach policy objectives? And what are the moral constraints on Nudge?

Every day we make decisions, and we don't always choose well. The authors of this book believe that the reason for this is that we are all susceptible to cognitive biases and blunders that make us prone to error. But they demonstrate how we can use our human fallability and the way we think to our advantage.

Regulatory reforms in Europe have focused on 'good regulation', 'better law-making', and most recently 'regulatory quality'. This article deals with the main instrument used by governments to achieve
regulatory quality in the law-making process, that is, regulatory impact assessment (RIA). The article argues that quality means different things to different stakeholders. Thus the approach to quality cannot be monolithic. Different stakeholders bring different logics in the RIA policy process. Logics are shaped by context. Yet the notions of quality that circulate in policy-makers’ circles are essentially
insensitive to context. The result is that policy-makers who have tried to import RIA in European contexts (especially continental contexts) have found it difficult to scratch below the surface of new
public management rhetoric and implement successful programmes. The argument here is not the trivial one that ‘context matters’ in the diffusion of RIA, but that we need to understand how it matters
in terms of dimensions and mechanisms. Hence the article breaks down ‘context’ into four dimensions, that is, institutions, territory, theories of the policy process, and legitimacy. The conclusions balance efficiency and legitimacy, and formulate policy recommendations.