Publications

The book makes a significant contribution to the literature on regulatory governance and is a must-read for regulators—whether you are already using insights from the behavioural sciences in your regulatory practice or want to do so, or if you are sceptical about the whole nudge-buzz.

It is human to make mistakes. It is indisputably human to make mistakes while filling in tax returns, benefit applications, and other government forms which are often tainted with complex language, requirements, and short deadlines. However, the unique human feature of forgiving these mistakes is disappearing with the digitization of government services and the automation of government decision-making. While the role of empathy has long been controversial in law, empathic measures have helped public authorities balance administrative values with citizens’ needs and deliver fair and legitimate decisions. The empathy of public servants has been particularly important for vulnerable citizens (e.g., disabled individuals, seniors, underrepresented minorities, low income). When empathy is threatened in the digital administrative state, vulnerable citizens are at risk of not being able to exercise their rights because they cannot engage with digital bureaucracy. This Article argues that empathy, the ability to relate to others and understand a legal situation from multiple perspectives, is a key value of administrative law which should be safeguarded in the digital administrative state. Empathy can contribute to the advancement of procedural due process, equal treatment, and the legitimacy of automation. The concept of administrative empathy does not aim to create arrays of exceptions, imbue law with emotions and individualized justice. Instead, this concept suggests avenues for humanizing digital government and automated decision-making through the complete understanding of citizens’ needs. This Article explores the role of empathy in the digital administrative state at two levels: First, it argues that empathy can be a partial response to some of the shortcomings of digital bureaucracy. At this level, administrative empathy acknowledges that citizens have different skills and needs, and this requires the redesign of pre-filled application forms, government platforms, algorithms, as well as assistance. Second, empathy should also operate ex post as a humanizing measure which can help ensure that administrative decision-making remains human. Drawing on comparative examples of empathic measures employed in the United States, the Netherlands, Estonia, and France, the academic contribution of this Article is twofold: first, it offers an interdisciplinary reflection on the role of empathy in administrative law and public administration for the digital age that seeks to advance the position of vulnerable citizens; second, it operationalizes the concept of administrative empathy.

Digital platforms have strengthened their power more and more by collecting and exploiting data processed through algorithms. Economic and social interactions are increasingly shaped by the technology and software. Such a reliance on digital technologies has brought about the tendency of private subjects (but also of public institutions) to replace traditional norms and rules with regulations based on the code (code is law). From this perspective digital giants are no longer market participants. Rather they are market makers and exert regulatory control over the terms which define the positions of commercial and final users. Moreover they aspire to displace more governmental and public roles over time, performing functions and tasks normally vested in public authorities such as judicial bodies and courts. This shift in power towards private actors has led to an expanding privatization in the field of individuals’ rights as well. Algorithms are replacing the traditional functions of law embedding private values and interests in the technology. They represent the key of digital platforms’ power. Therefore regulators should ‘capture’ the algorithm to steer its effects and thanks to the technology be able to introduce regulatory principles into the design of the digital code.

Artificial Intelligence has great potential in all areas of our lives, but it also presents risks for fundamental rights and the rule of law. The European Union is trying to create a balanced regulatory framework between the pros and cons of AI. On 21 April 2021 EU published a comprehensive proposal for an AI regulation, which should protect and promote European rights and values, without impeding the technological, industrial, and commercial development of AI. This article aims to give a first analysis of the proposal, focusing on its main positive and negative aspects.

At the center of contemporary debates over public law lies administrative agencies’ discretion to impose rules. Yet, for every one of these rules, there are also unrules nearby. Often overlooked and sometimes barely visible, unrules are the decisions that regulators make to lift or limit the scope of a regulatory obligation, for instance through waivers, exemptions, and exceptions. In some cases, unrules enable regulators to reduce burdens on regulated entities or to conserve valuable government resources in ways that make law more efficient. However, too much discretion to create unrules can facilitate undue business influence over the law, weaken regulatory schemes, and even undermine the rule of law. In this paper, we conduct the first systematic empirical investigation of the hidden world of unrules. Using a computational linguistic approach to identify unrules across the Federal Register, the Code of Federal Regulations, and the United States Code, we show that unrules are an integral and substantial feature of the federal regulatory system. Our analysis shows that, by several conservative measures, there exists one obligation-alleviating word for approximately every five to six obligation-imposing words in federal law. We also show that unrules are surprisingly unrestrained by administrative law. In stark contrast to administrative law’s treatment of obligation-imposing rules, regulators wield substantially more discretion in deploying unrules to alleviate regulatory obligations. As a result, a major form of agency power remains hidden from view and relatively unencumbered by law. Recognizing the central role that unrules play in our regulatory system reveals the need to reorient administrative law and incorporate unrules more explicitly into its assumptions, doctrines, and procedures.