Publications

During the past decade, a small but rapidly growing number of Law&Tech scholars have been applying algorithmic methods in their legal research. This Article does it too, for the sake of saving disclosure regulation failure: a normative strategy that has long been considered dead by legal scholars, but conspicuously abused by rule-makers. Existing proposals to revive disclosure duties, however, either focus on the industry policies (e.g. seeking to reduce consumers’ costs of reading) or on rulemaking (e.g. by simplifying linguistic intricacies). But failure may well depend on both. Therefore, this Article develops a `comprehensive approach', suggesting to use computational tools to cope with linguistic and behavioral failures at both the enactment and implementation phases of disclosure duties, thus filling a void in the Law & Tech scholarship. Specifically, it outlines how algorithmic tools can be used in a holistic manner to address the many failures of disclosures from the rulemaking in parliament to consumer screens. It suggests a multi-layered design where lawmakers deploy three tools in order to produce optimal disclosure rules: machine learning, natural language processing, and behavioral experimentation through regulatory sandboxes. To clarify how and why these tasks should be performed, disclosures in the contexts of online contract terms and privacy online are taken as examples. Because algorithmic rulemaking is frequently met with well-justified skepticism, problems of its compatibility with legitimacy, efficacy and proportionality are also discussed.

Since the original publication of Nudge more than a decade ago, the title has entered the vocabulary of businesspeople, policy makers, engaged citizens, and consumers everywhere. The book has given rise to more than 400 “nudge units” in governments around the world and countless groups of behavioral scientists in every part of the economy. It has taught us how to use thoughtful “choice architecture”—a concept the authors invented—to help us make better decisions for ourselves, our families, and our society. Now, the authors have rewritten the book from cover to cover, making use of their experiences in and out of government over the past dozen years as well as an explosion of new research in numerous academic disciplines. To commit themselves to never undertaking this daunting task again, they are calling this the “final edition.” It offers a wealth of new insights, for both its avowed fans and newcomers to the field, about a wide variety of issues that we face in our daily lives—COVID-19, health, personal finance, retirement savings, credit card debt, home mortgages, medical care, organ donation, climate change, and “sludge” (paperwork and other nuisances we don’t want, and that keep us from getting what we do want)—all while honoring one of the cardinal rules of nudging: make it fun!

The book makes a significant contribution to the literature on regulatory governance and is a must-read for regulators—whether you are already using insights from the behavioural sciences in your regulatory practice or want to do so, or if you are sceptical about the whole nudge-buzz.

It is human to make mistakes. It is indisputably human to make mistakes while filling in tax returns, benefit applications, and other government forms which are often tainted with complex language, requirements, and short deadlines. However, the unique human feature of forgiving these mistakes is disappearing with the digitization of government services and the automation of government decision-making. While the role of empathy has long been controversial in law, empathic measures have helped public authorities balance administrative values with citizens’ needs and deliver fair and legitimate decisions. The empathy of public servants has been particularly important for vulnerable citizens (e.g., disabled individuals, seniors, underrepresented minorities, low income). When empathy is threatened in the digital administrative state, vulnerable citizens are at risk of not being able to exercise their rights because they cannot engage with digital bureaucracy. This Article argues that empathy, the ability to relate to others and understand a legal situation from multiple perspectives, is a key value of administrative law which should be safeguarded in the digital administrative state. Empathy can contribute to the advancement of procedural due process, equal treatment, and the legitimacy of automation. The concept of administrative empathy does not aim to create arrays of exceptions, imbue law with emotions and individualized justice. Instead, this concept suggests avenues for humanizing digital government and automated decision-making through the complete understanding of citizens’ needs. This Article explores the role of empathy in the digital administrative state at two levels: First, it argues that empathy can be a partial response to some of the shortcomings of digital bureaucracy. At this level, administrative empathy acknowledges that citizens have different skills and needs, and this requires the redesign of pre-filled application forms, government platforms, algorithms, as well as assistance. Second, empathy should also operate ex post as a humanizing measure which can help ensure that administrative decision-making remains human. Drawing on comparative examples of empathic measures employed in the United States, the Netherlands, Estonia, and France, the academic contribution of this Article is twofold: first, it offers an interdisciplinary reflection on the role of empathy in administrative law and public administration for the digital age that seeks to advance the position of vulnerable citizens; second, it operationalizes the concept of administrative empathy.

Digital platforms have strengthened their power more and more by collecting and exploiting data processed through algorithms. Economic and social interactions are increasingly shaped by the technology and software. Such a reliance on digital technologies has brought about the tendency of private subjects (but also of public institutions) to replace traditional norms and rules with regulations based on the code (code is law). From this perspective digital giants are no longer market participants. Rather they are market makers and exert regulatory control over the terms which define the positions of commercial and final users. Moreover they aspire to displace more governmental and public roles over time, performing functions and tasks normally vested in public authorities such as judicial bodies and courts. This shift in power towards private actors has led to an expanding privatization in the field of individuals’ rights as well. Algorithms are replacing the traditional functions of law embedding private values and interests in the technology. They represent the key of digital platforms’ power. Therefore regulators should ‘capture’ the algorithm to steer its effects and thanks to the technology be able to introduce regulatory principles into the design of the digital code.

Artificial Intelligence has great potential in all areas of our lives, but it also presents risks for fundamental rights and the rule of law. The European Union is trying to create a balanced regulatory framework between the pros and cons of AI. On 21 April 2021 EU published a comprehensive proposal for an AI regulation, which should protect and promote European rights and values, without impeding the technological, industrial, and commercial development of AI. This article aims to give a first analysis of the proposal, focusing on its main positive and negative aspects.